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Abstract 
 
The literature on the causes of how terrorist organizations are formed and how counter 
terrorism measures can be more effective is immense. What is novel in terrorism literature is 
de-radicalization in terrorist organizations. This paper hopes to shed light on the de-
radicalization process in terrorist organizations based in Egypt. In order to achieve that goal, 
the first part of the paper will deal with the de-radicalization process. The second part will 
briefly describe the major radical terrorist organizations that are effective in Egypt. The last 
part will combine the two parts and bring in suggestions on the de-radicalization process 
itself. Terrorism and de-radicalization are complicated threats to nearly all societies. 
Therefore, it is important to go beyond security and intelligence approaches and take 
proactive measures. It is best to view what is de-radicalization and how it can be achieved. 
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1a. De-radicalization 
 
There are different views on de-radicalization. Noricks (2009,300) states that de-
radicalization can be ideological or behavioural. Ashour (2008) defines it as a process that 
leads an individual (or group) to change his attitudes about violence against civilians. 
“Ideological de-radicalization” results in a change in beliefs, a “behavioural de-radicalization” 
emphasizes changes in actions. Horgan (2008) tries to separate disengagement from de-
radicalization. The former is more of a change in behaviour whereas the latter postulates 
attitude change. Ashour (2008) puts forward a third category, organizational de-radicalization. 
This type of de-radicalization takes place at organizational level. If it is successful, the 
terrorist organization turns away from terrorism without separating into small violent 
offshoots (examples such as the PLO). 
Renee Garfinkel has investigated seven de-radicalization cases (Davis, 2009, 301) 
between Muslim, Jewish and Christian groups and concluded that de-radicalization is more of 
a spiritual experience, similar to religious conversion. The decision to de-radicalize was often 
an individual decision that isolated the person from the group. In most of the cases trauma 
acted as a facilitator towards de-radicalization.  
Tore Bjorgo (2009) identifies push and pull factors that affect an activist’s decision to 
leave the group. Push factors are negative circumstances or social forces that push the group 
member out of the organization. These factors may be parental/social disapproval, criminal 
prosecution etc. Pull factors are opportunities or social forces that attract the individual to a 
more promising future. Longing for a new life, new employment, desire to establish a family, 
to pursue parental roles can be pull factors. The effect of push factors may be hard to 
determine in advance. A common reason for staying in the group is that the terrorist has no 
place to return to. He has destroyed the relationships with his friends/relatives by joining the 
group. If he decides to defect from the terrorist organization he may be isolated, alone and 
lonely (Bjorgo, 2006, 12). He has the incentive to think that the society will no longer tolerate 
him. Examples of push factors are criminal prosecution, parental or social disapproval, and 
counter violence from oppositional groups, loss of faith in ideology or politics of the group 
and discomfort with group’s violent activities. Examples of pull factors are desire for a 
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normal life; desire to establish a family, new employment, educational opportunities, new role 
model or social group, new compelling ideology or belief structure.  
Noricks (2009) states that joining a group is more beneficial than leaving the group. 
Joining a group brings in concepts like fraternity, acceptance, purpose, identity and status 
whereas leaving one forces the group member to repair mended former relationships, forming 
a new or remembering an old identity. Leaving a group also may bring condemnation by 
group members and a degree of uncertainty. 
Jurgensmeyer’s (2001) study on the other hand puts forward the importance of 
articulation by the religious authorities. If authorities renounce violence on theological 
grounds, particularly in religious based, radical terrorist organizations, this could be decisive 
in catalysing the decision to leave the group. Counter ideological education is the foundation 
for most of the state run de-radicalization programs.  
 Most of the de-radicalization programs have an ideological foundation. This 
foundation is usually a reinterpretation of theological statements. This is done for the purpose 
of “de-legitimizing the use of violence against the state, the society and the ‘other’” (Ashour, 
2008,11). These programs also include social service and individual counselling components.  
De-radicalization is not merely the radicalization process in reverse (Rabasa, 2010). It 
has distinct features that are different from radicalization itself. In order to understand what 
de-radicalization denotes one must have a working definition of it. In order to define de-
radicalization one needs to define radicalization. It is defined as “the process of adopting an 
extremist belief system, including the willingness to use support or facilitate violence as a 
method to effect societal change (Rabasa, 2010, 1)”. From that starting point then “de-
radicalization can be the process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it 
is not acceptable to use violence to effect societal change” (Rabasa, 2010). Islamists can be 
defined as those who reject the separation of religious authority from the authority of the 
state. Within this context Islamist radicalization involves adopting a belief system that wants 
to create an Islamic State. Muslims adhering to the ultraconservative Salafist interpretation of 
Islam wage jihad or armed struggle against the enemies of Islam, regardless of whether they 
are distant (U.S. and Western World) or near (those Muslim states that do not adhere to the 
Salafist interpretation of Islam) (Gerges, 2005, 3-9).  
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How does an individual leave (Mc Cauley, 2008) an organization? A militant leaves 
an organization only when an expected utility of leaving is greater than the expected utility of 
staying. Usually top-notch officials leave organizations with grace while others leave them 
secretly but they all know that they cannot come back (Rabasa, 2010, 19). The disengaged 
member will need support from family and friends if not he won’t be able to cope with the 
sense of being an outcast from his group and the rest of the society. De-radicalization 
programs should aim to shape the views of society towards ex-militants. ıf the society isn’t 
susceptible to letting ex-militants back in, the program will not be successful. Another 
important factor is why a person leaves a group may not be the reason why he joined it. He 
may have joined the group because he felt an injustice was invading his and other’s lives or he 
may be leaving because of a better future etc. Is the injustice over and is that why he is 
leaving? Certainly not. The longer an individual stays in a group, the harder it will be for him 
to defect. He has committed/invested so much he can’t get out. 
Mc Cauley (2008, p. 280) provides a framework in understanding how de-
radicalization starts. He calls the process “desistance.” He categorizes how it begins under 
three sections: actors, actions and outcomes. Actors in a de-radicalization process consist of 
the radical/terrorist group and the government. A de-radicalization process/program cannot 
start without the two. There may be times when the government may be replaced by NGOs or 
other institutions. Actions can be used by both the terrorists and the government. Terrorist 
actions can be (using) violence or (providing) social and economic initiative to supporters and 
(creating) political initiative. Government actions can be killing or imprisioning terrorists, 
hardening targets and social and economic initiatives aimed at the terrorist base, political 
initiatives aimed at militants and domestic political initiatives. Outcomes usually refer to 
terrorist decline. The terrorist organization may experience an organizational breakdown by 
disabling the group or splitting or dividing into different groups. 
 
1.b Islamic De-radicalization 
 
Islamic de-radicalization can be defined as rejecting the permissibility of using 
violence against civilians, the denunciation of Muslims who do not adhere to strict rules and 
opposition to democracy and civil liberties (Ashour o. , 2008). Islamic radicalization involves 
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adopting the belief that, to create an Islamic state, Muslims must adopt a strict ultra 
conservative view of Islam and also wage jihad. Islamist de-radicalization involves rejecting 
this belief and objecting to using violence against civilians and its practice of 
excommunication of Muslims who do not adhere to these rules. 
Islamic de-radicalization starts on the pretext that the militant has a wrong 
interpretation of Islam. He had not been given a proper state’s view of education therefore he 
has come up with a wrong interpretation of Islam without contesting it. This can be undone by 
the program. The logic is flawed so it should be corrected or revised by a credible voice. 
Providing education and starting a dialogue with the militant while in the prison, is the first 
step. Next, a job has to be offered for both psychological reasoning and continuation of 
everyday life. These two steps facilitate the individual’s return to society. The next step is 
providing support such as counselling to check if everything is in order. Finally, the program 
must continue with monitoring to see if promises are held.  
Ex-militants can’t be held in prisons for a long time. Prisons are usually known to be 
incubators of radicalization. Prison based programs should give education to detainees. 
Worldview of prisoners should be discussed and refuted through a religious dialogue 
facilitated by clerics who will facilitate the individual’s reintegration into society. Countering 
ideology is necessary but not efficient in rehabilitating ex radicals. Means to meet the 
militants’ psychological and material needs have to be provided. Simply refuting ideology 
isn’t going to result in permanent disengagement or de-radicalization. If the radical continues 
to associate with peers and has no chance to establish a life outside the group, he will not 
defect. So it is important not only to offer assistance to radical members of the group but also 
to their families. Ideological elements and aftercare elements need to work in accordance with 
each other for successful programs (Kruglanski, 2012). 
There may be some problems involved with de-radicalization programs. It is difficult 
to understand whether an individual is de-radicalized or disengaged. The program requires 
monitoring.  Not all members of a radicalized group leave, it depends on the commitment that 
they have made to the group, if the commitment cannot be neglected the member cannot leave 
his environment. It is extremely difficult to renounce ideology. That’s why religious leaders 
or leaders who are authorities on religion and philosophy need to be recruited in the program. 
Extremists need to renounce violence and extremism not their religion. 
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 It is difficult to measure success for de-radicalization programs. Every individual who 
has disengaged from the group may still support its radical ideas and yet not act upon them. 
So is the success rate dependent on the individual not committing violence or having a 
complete transformation over his belief system? Horgan (2008,276) records that after 
interviewing former terrorists that terrorists might be disengaged but hardly de-radicalized. 
Second, even if some choose to de-radicalize there will always be hard liners refusing to 
change their beliefs or refrain from violence. Third, every program must not only produce an 
ideological and a material outcome. Ideological support and change to the belief system, 
material meaning jobs and support mechanisms for the aftermath of leaving the organization 
must also be provided. The Saudi Arabian experience can be inferred as being successful. The 
detainees received religious dialogue and financial incentives and more contact with their 
families than others who didn’t take part in the program (Porges, 2010). 
 
1.c The Success Story: Saudi Arabia 
 
A success story of de-radicalization appears to be the Saudi Arabia case. Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) made the mistake of targeting security forces and western 
civilians. This mobilized the government to use security forces against the terrorist 
organization. Saudi Arabia’s soft counterterrorism strategy was made up of three parts 
prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare (Rabasa, 2010, s. 57). They implemented programs to 
counter radicalization by providing the public information about Islam and the threat of 
extremism. They tried to express the point that extremists do not care about Muslims; instead 
they use them to achieve their goals. Most participants were young and from large lower or 
middle class families. Those who participated in the aftercare program didn’t receive a proper 
religious education as youngsters. They were susceptible to extremist views. The program 
provided them education via religious dialogue and instruction, psychological counselling and 
extensive social support (El-Said, 2012). Social and athletic programs for young Saudis were 
introduced in order to keep them away from extremism. Participants had some common 
points. None had previous criminal history. Many of the detainees had little knowledge of 
religious matters. They had wanted to become more religious and it led them to extremism. 
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They received less attention at home and trouble later in life. They also had difficulty with 
relationships with authority. 
1d. Egypt and De-radicalization 
President Sadat’s assassination ushered in a new era for Egypt. The Jihad Group that 
had committed the assassination in 1981 pushed the government into issuing martial law, 
repression and police power (Mc Cauley, 2008, p. 289). The government also put pressure on 
religious figures and mosques. Sermons that were delivered in the mosques had to be 
approved by the government.  Many Jihad Group members were jailed and a conflict over 
leadership became apparent. The Jihad Group split into two parts, the Islamic Group and 
Islamic Jihad. The Islamic group attacked Christians and security forces whereas the Islamic 
Jihad attacked government leaders (Mc Cauley, 2008). Terrorist attacks increased in 1992 and 
started to decline by 1995. 
In 1997, just as the government had thought that it was controlling the extremists, the 
Islamic Group militants attacked a tourist group in Luxor. The violence that targeted the 
tourism sector backlashed (Wheatley, 2008, p. 256). Angry Egyptians rushed after the 
terrorists condemning them to death. The attack had been made to push the government into a 
corner so that economically disadvantaged Egyptians would blame the government for the 
losses and yet even Islamic Group’s supporters protested the event. The government used this 
incident to show the public how terrorist groups and radicals only target the innocent. 
Previously, in 1993 in a plot to kill Prime Minister Atef Sidqi, the Islamic Group killed an 
Egyptian schoolgirl. (Mc Cauley, 2008). Indiscriminate violence against civilians caused the 
downfall (Drevon, 2015). 
In 1997, the Islamic Group, the largest armed Islamist movement in Egypt, declared a 
unilateral ceasefire (Ashour O. , De-Radicalization of Jihad? the Impact of Egyptian Islamist 
Revisionists on Al Qaeda, 2010). From that point on, the government could start to implement 
its de-radicalization program on the captured leaders. This resulted in a further breakdown in 
the Islamic Group (Mc Cauley, 2008, p. 289).  
Egypt lacked de-radicalization in 1990. It took steps towards laying the groundwork 
for the de-radicalization process in al-Gama-al-Islamiyya (IG) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
(EIJ). These were not structured rehabilitation programs such as the Saudi Arabia program. 
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They did not include classes and counseling sessions in the prison. It was more of an ongoing 
negotiation between the militants and the government officials. The regime gave books to the 
prisoners that enhanced their understanding of religion. This was important because none of 
the members of the terrorist organization had prior knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence. The 
government also hired religious intermediaries to join the effort. The intermediaries included 
scholars from Al Azhar University and from the Muslim Brotherhood. IG’s imprisoned 
leadership announced in 1997 that they would halt attacks. The rest of the organization did 
not comply with the decision up until 1999. The government officials who took part in the 
dialogues started to facilitate the leaders’ effort in the de-radicalization process by bettering 
prison conditions. Some prisoners were provided amnesty. The IG leadership persuaded 
others to de-radicalize as well.  
After the September 11 attacks, the IG leadership was allowed to meet with the 
representatives from the organization. The leaders were allowed to visit almost all of the 
imprisoned members of the terrorist organization. IG leaders wrote books denouncing the 
group’s previous actions and introduced their new ideology. These books were published and 
distributed by the state. In 2003 as a result of the de-radicalization process, the Egyptian 
government released thousands of IG prisoners who supported the group’s new ideology 
(Ashour, 2008, 627). 
The Egyptian government used the former IG members to follow the same course for 
EIJ (Gunaratna, 2009). This wasn’t successful until the chief ideologue of EIJ, Sayyid Imam 
Al Sharif, was transferred from Yemen (where he was imprisoned after September 11) to 
Egypt. Sayyid Imam wrote a book that challenged the extremists “Rationalizing Jihad in 
Egypt and the World.” The supporters of the ideologue were promised release from prison on 
the condition of de-radicalizing. A few of the members had already joined Al Qaeda but most 
of the militants followed the footsteps of their leaders. Al Sharif’s criticism of radical Islam 
was compiled into an article that was published in two prominent newspapers. EIJ members 
who had approved of Al Sharif’s new ideology were released from prison. They were also 
provided with jobs and medical care. 
 
1.e Egypt and Countering Radicalization: The Government 
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President Sadat’s assassination resulted in new counterterrorism measures for Egypt. 
The government identified extremist Islamism as a threat to “all aspects of life in Egypt” 
(Wheatley, 2008, p.254). This meant that Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Group and Islamic 
Jihad would be under scrutiny. The government pressed for international support and 
solidarity from its allies on crushing Islamic radicalism. Next, the government introduced 
policies to repress extremists within Egypt. Martial law was renewed until 2010. Martial law 
provided enough space for the government arrests and detentions. Membership in a terrorist 
organization and military training in a foreign country became crimes punishable by death 
(US Department of State, 2005). Civilian courts no longer accepted cases of militant Islamists 
who were subject to military trials (Berger, 1993). The Muslim Brotherhood was blamed for 
having a stronghold  at the union of university faculty and students, and this stronghold was 
disturbing the government (World news connection, 1997). The goverment increased the 
resources that were allocated to counterterrorism.  
The Ministry of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) is legally responsible for issuing 
guidance to which all imams in Egypt are required to adhere. This includes weekly 
instructions on a provided theme that aims to prevent extremist language in sermons. Al-
Azhar University cooperated with international programs to help train imams to promote 
tolerance and non-violence, interfaith cooperation, and human rights. The Ministry of Islamic 
Endowments is also required to license all mosques in Egypt; however, many continue to 
operate without licenses. The government has the authority to appoint and monitor the imams 
who lead prayers in licensed mosques, and the government pays their salaries (U.S 
Department of State, 2015). 
Ashour (2010) also records that common causes of de-radicalization such as 
comprehensive but selective inducements from the state are decisive in the outcome. Other 
causes can be charismatic leadership, state repression and interactions with the “other” 
(Ashour O. , 2007).  
What constitutes a de-radicalization program’s success is a topic that needs to be 
addressed. (Clubb, 2015) creates two categories in assessing de-radicalization programs. He 
provides two definitions for de-radicalization. The first definition is a broad definition that 
expects a change in a wide range of attitudes. This may be a complete shift in an individual’s 
mindset as Silke (2011) refers to it. It may also be “the transformation of ideology.”  
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The second definition consists of a narrow definition of de-radicalization. This may be 
the softening of views where the individual sees that terrorism is the illegitimate and immoral 
way to reach objectives (Bjorgo T. a., 2008). Broad and narrow de-radicalization refers to 
changing attitudes to create a behavioral change. Disengagement on the other hand does not 
stress attitudinal change although they are not involved in terrorism and they may still support 
the causes and actions (Silke A. , 2011).  
So what is success for de-radicalization programs? Is it enough to keep the militants 
from staging attacks or do the militants have to be disinfected from both ideology and action? 
How can the program coordinator be sure that de-radicalization has occurred and recidivism 
won’t occur? These are some of the problems that need to be addressed with further study. If 
the program has a clear structure and measurable objectives, it can be evaluated but a general 
equation of what constitutes success and failure for de-radicalization programs is impossible 
to define. 
2. Egypt and Terrorist Organizations2 
The two primary terrorist groups operating in Egypt are Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM) 
and Ajnad Misr. ABM is a Sinai-based group that swore allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) on November 3. While ABM is most active in the Sinai, it has 
demonstrated a capability to conduct attacks throughout Egypt, even in Cairo. Ajnad Misr is a 
Cairo-based terrorist group that has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in 
downtown Cairo and focuses primarily on government and security targets (U.S Department 
of State, 2015). 
In June 2014, former head of the Egyptian Armed Forces Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi was 
elected president. An interim government had been formed in July 2013, right after the 
removal of former President Mohamed Morsi. President al-Sisi has focused on 
counterterrorism in Egypt, and he made counterterrorism issues one of the pillars of his first 
speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2014. President al-Sisi’s government and 
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the Egyptian military and security forces continue to pursue counterterrorism initiatives, 
particularly in the Sinai (U.S. Department of State, 2015).  
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the MB-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 
and NGOs affiliated with the MB were outlawed in 2014. The Egyptian government 
designated the MB as a terrorist organization in December 2013 and the High Administrative 
Court dissolved the FJP on August 9, 2014. (U.S Department of State, 2015). 
2.a Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis 
Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on April 9, 2014, Ansar Bayt al-
Maqdis (ABM) rose to prominence in 2011 following the Egyptian uprisings and is 
responsible for attacks on Israel and Egyptian government and security elements, and tourists 
in Egypt. In November 2014, ABM officially declared allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) (U.S. Department of State, 2015). 
ABM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israeli interests, 
including a July 2012 attack against a Sinai pipeline exporting gas to Israel and an August 
2012 rocket attack on the southern Israeli city of Eilat. In October 2013, ABM claimed 
responsibility for a suicide bombing targeting the South Sinai Security Directorate in el Tor, 
which killed three people and injured more than 45. In January 2014, ABM downed an 
Egyptian military helicopter in a missile attack, killing five soldiers on board; and also 
claimed responsibility for four attacks involving car bombs and hand grenades in Cairo, 
which left six people dead and over 70 wounded, many of them civilian bystanders (U.S. 
Department of State, 2015).  
ABM has targeted government officials, including the September 2013 attempted 
assassination of the Egyptian Interior Minister, and the January 2014 assassination of the head 
of the Interior Minister’s technical office. In February 2014, ABM claimed responsibility for 
the bombing of a tour bus in the Sinai Peninsula, killing the Egyptian driver and three South 
Korean tourists, in its first attack against foreign tourists (U.S. Department of State, 2015).  
In October 2014, ABM beheaded four individuals who they claimed spied for Israel. 
Also in October, ABM claimed an attack on a security checkpoint that left over 26 Egyptian 
soldiers dead and wounded 26 others, including civilians. ABM subsequently released a video 
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of the attack as part of its announcement declaring allegiance to ISIL in November 2014 (U.S. 
Department of State, 2015).  
ABM is estimated to have several hundred fighters in the Sinai and affiliated cells in 
the Nile Valley. Even though ABM’s operations are based out of the Sinai Peninsula, the 
group’s reach extends to Cairo and the Egyptian Nile Valley, and across the border into Gaza. 
Although the source of ABM’s funding is largely unknown, there are indications that ABM 
may receive funding from external actors (U.S. Department of State, 2015).  
2b. Ajnad Misr 
Ajnad Misr is the only terrorist group operating exclusively in the Greater Cairo area. 
The group typically relies on the use of primitive weaponry, including homemade IEDs, to 
execute its attacks. 
 On January 23, 2014, Ajnad Misr declared its presence with a tweet: “In the name of 
God the Merciful, may He stand beside us.” The following day, the group released their first 
statement where they claimed responsibility for several attacks as early as November 20, 
2013, and began a media campaign, “Retribution is Life,” which they promoted as a twitter 
hash tag (in Arabic). Since this time, Ajnad Misr has been the most active terrorist group 
operating in Egypt outside of the Sinai Peninsula (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 
2015). 
Ajnad Misr differs from other terrorist groups operating in Egypt in that it does not 
fully insist on the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Ajnad Misr recognizes the legitimacy 
of Egypt as a distinct nation (as opposed to the Islamic umma). The group also employs the 
language of the January 25, 2011 revolution, lamenting that “the goals of the revolution” have 
not been fulfilled (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2015). 
Despite this difference, the group has adopted language in its statements that would 
align it with a Salafi jihadi ideology, and the group quotes Ibn Taymiyyah, an Islamic scholar 
from the Middle Ages whose teachings have greatly influenced Salafism. 
Also, unlike some other jihadi groups (particularly those affiliated with Al Qaeda), 
Ajnad Misr takes a sympathetic view toward civilians, even those in opposition to the group. 
Ajnad Misr claims to direct its hostilities mostly towards state actors (U.S. Department of 
State, 2015). The group specifically targets particular individuals whom it sees as offenders; 
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this included Brigadier General Ahmed Zaki, killed in an April 23, 2014 attack, and whom the 
terrorist organization blamed for the arrest and torture of Egyptian youth. 
The group takes particular issue with the Egyptian state’s treatment of 
women, protests abuse of female protesters and promises retribution to the survivors of those 
who had been killed by the state. Jana Miser’s ideological and operational logic falls 
somewhere between a traditional insurgency and the Salafi jihadi groups operating in the 
Sinai. Regardless of differences, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis have declared Ajnad Misr to be their 
“brothers.” 
According to TIMEP’s data, Ajnad Misr has claimed at least 15 attacks in Greater 
Cairo, many of which have been targeted toward particular police officers and/or their 
vehicles. It claimed responsibility for two attacks on police in Giza, killing eight and 
wounding over 90 (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2015). 
On April 2, 2014, Ajnad Misr executed a series of bombings at Cairo University, 
killing a police officer and wounding others. On the anniversary of massive protests calling 
for Morsi’s ouster, Ajnad Misr planned a series of explosions outside Ittihadeya Palace in 
Heliopolis. A Ministry of Interior explosives expert was killed while trying to defuse an 
explosive that detonated and other personnel were injured. A second bomb exploded an hour 
later, injuring a policeman. The third explosion killed another explosives expert who was 
trying to defuse an explosive device. Ajnad Misr had announced these attacks via social 
media and later claimed to have defused some of the devices in order to minimize civilian 
casualties (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2015). 
3. Conclusion 
Terrorism and de-radicalization are complicated threats to nearly all societies. 
Therefore, it is important to go beyond security and intelligence approaches and take the 
necessary proactive measures. It is best to view what is de-radicalization and how it can be 
achieved.  
De-radicalization has two important goals and any successful de-radicalization 
program must fulfill these goals. The first goal is obtaining intelligence on extremist 
organizations and discrediting the extremist ideology. There are four major important points 
in de-radicalization (Rabasa, 2010, s. 170). First, the state needs to find credible interlocutors. 
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Who can convince the prisoners to move away from extremism? Second, de-radicalization 
programs need to be balanced with ideological components that need to be implanted after the 
prisoner’s release. Third, a monitoring system has to be implemented to see that former 
detainees stay detached from their former actions and to provide aftercare (theological and 
psychological counseling). Fourth, if the militant’s family is included in the program it is 
highly probable that the militant will stay disengaged longer. 
If governments choose the path of collective de-radicalization, de-radicalizing as a 
group rather than individuals being considered, they must take three important points into 
account (Rabasa, 2010,188). First, policy makers should support public disclosure of de-
radicalization when it is necessary. The public disclosure of renouncing extremism is an 
important example for followers. Second, governments must maintain a high level of 
international cooperation for countering terrorism. Third, rather than pressing for the less 
committed to de-radicalize it may be wiser to communicate with the hard core that may have 
more influence over the group. 
The de-radicalization program in Egypt can be best applied to Ajnad Mısr. Ajnad Mısr 
is a hybrid terrorist organization. It operates like a traditional insurgency group and a Salafi 
Jihadi group at the same time. It claims to be concerned about civilian casualties; it has no 
concern in forming or being part of an Islamic state or caliphate. It rebels against the ill 
treatment of women by the government. Its issues and major aims seem to be different from 
Islamic Radical groups. 
 Ansar Bayt Al Maqdis on the other hand, is an extremist group that has pledged 
allegiance to the Islamic State. The Saudi or the previous Egyptian experience in de-
radicalization can be used as a blueprint. Dialogue with the prisoners, providing counseling 
and material support both for the ex-militants and their families is crucial. Offering better job 
opportunities and living conditions for the militant and his family are crucial. The government 
also needs to produce a fertile ground for the society to readmit the militant despite his past 
crimes. A lot rests upon the shoulders of the government. Whether or not the steps to de-
radicalize terrorist organizations can be realized is based upon one important assumption, 
governments need to reconsider their policies towards terrorist organizations and de-
radicalization because terrorism remains a security threat to all governments and it will 
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remain a threat in the near future. Its attributes, motivations and countering measures may 
change but the threat itself will always be there. 
The post-coup Egypt no longer accommodates the Muslim Brotherhood. It no longer 
has a strong presence in society or a network of social services. Its organization has been 
shattered. Its leadership is in jail, exiled or dead (Lynch, 2016). The followers are torn 
between other leadership options. According to Lynch (2016) Muslim Brotherhood served as 
a firewall against other extremism, particularly Al Qaeda. He also points that the competing 
view is that the Brotherhood facilitated violent extremism. Even if it was not directly involved 
in the violent attacks it set individuals and groups to commit violent attacks. The second view 
is content in the sense that since The Muslim Brotherhood is more manageable it no longer 
constitutes a threat but the first view is more pessimistic. If the Brotherhood was a firewall 
that firewall is down. Without the firewall Egypt may encounter new radical groups and 
offshoots or an already active ISIS in Egypt. Egypt looks as if it will continue to be on the 
radicalization and de-radicalization agenda for a time to come. 
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